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Abstract 
The Barcelona process so far has been a valuable systemic/institutional advance in Euro-Med 
relations and a confidence-building measure on a large scale. But it has not been a sufficient driving 
force to have created a momentum of economic, political and social advance in the partner states. It 
is therefore quite plausible that the EU should seek some new advance – through the European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) – to build on the positive features of Barcelona and so try to introduce 
some new driving force. The Action Plans currently being adopted seek to make the often vague 
intentions of the Association Agreements of the Barcelona process more operational by linking 
them to either domestic policy programmes of the partner state or to EU policy norms and standards 
as an external anchor. In this paper we first crystallise alternative approaches for the ENP to become 
a real driving force under the headings of ‘conditionality’ and ‘socialisation’. The conditionality 
concept would mean that the EU sets out i) what incentives it offers, and ii) the conditions on which 
these incentives would be delivered. The socialisation concept relies essentially on a learning 
process that comes from the extensive interaction between actors in the partner states and the EU, 
which induces the partner states to engage in policy reforms that are to a degree modelled on EU 
norms or derive some inspiration from them. For the EU to become a driving force for reform in the 
region also requires that it does not have to face an uphill struggle against negative tendencies, for 
example in the widening and deepening of radical Islam – and here the issue of coherence in the 
approaches of the EU and US together is paramount.   
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FROM BARCELONA PROCESS TO 
NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY 
ASSESSMENTS AND OPEN ISSUES 
CEPS WORKING DOCUMENT NO. 220/MARCH 2005 
MICHAEL EMERSON AND GERGANA NOUTCHEVA 
1.  Assessment of the Barcelona process  
The Barcelona process has its 10
th birthday in 2005, which is reason enough for its evaluation. 
Yet the strategic environment surrounding this Euro-Mediterranean initiative has also drastically 
changed in the last year with two unconnected events – the huge enlargement of the EU and the 
Iraqi war. The EU’s enlargement was the direct motivation for the EU to develop a new European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). Now, however, the turmoil in the Arab world following the Iraqi 
war heightens the case for the EU to work out what its own strategic objectives in the region are 
really to be. EU policy-makers say nowadays that the ENP is going to re-invigorate the Barcelona 
process. That sounds like an interesting proposition, but it needs to be specified and examined. 
Where has the Barcelona process actually got to? What extra impetus for reform and 
modernisation in the region could the ENP add? 
1.1 Basic  features 
The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) or Barcelona process is the general framework 
for the relations between the European Union, its member states and the countries situated in 
the south and east of the Mediterranean area (referred to as the ‘Mediterranean partners’).
1 At 
the close of the Barcelona conference in November 1995, the parties adopted an agreement 
made up of a declaration and a work programme launching a partnership in three spheres: a) 
political and security, b) economic and financial, and c) social and cultural.
2 The Barcelona 
process soon established an elaborate institutional structure, which is summarised in Figure 1, 
with its multilateral, bilateral and unilateral dimensions.  
Following the launch of the Barcelona process in 1995 the main action consisted of negotiating a 
new set of bilateral agreements with the partner states, replacing the prior generation of 
cooperation agreements with the much more extensive and ambitious Euro-Med Association 
Agreements. While the agreements with Turkey, Israel, the Palestinian Authority, Tunisia, 
Morocco, Jordan and Egypt have entered into force, those with Algeria and Lebanon are signed 
but await ratification. For Syria the negotiations have been completed but the agreement is not 
yet signed.  
                                                   
1 Originally there were 12 partner states: Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, 
Syria, Tunisia, Turkey and the Palestinian Authority. Cyprus and Malta have since acceded to the EU and 
Turkey is ‘expected’ to open accession negotiations in 2005. Libya’s full integration into the Barcelona process 
is currently under discussion.  
2 For a more detailed analysis, see M. Emerson and N. Tocci, The Rubik Cube of the Greater Middle East, 
CEPS, Brussels, 2003, and E. Philippart, The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: Unique features, first results 
and forthcoming challenges, CEPS Middle East Working Paper No. 10, CEPS, Brussels, April 2003. 2 | EMERSON & NOUTCHEVA 
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The implementation of the work programme is overseen and prioritised by the Euro-
Mediterranean Conference of Foreign Ministers and a ‘Euro-Med Committee’ of senior officials, 
which meets six times per year. Preparation and follow-up work for the meetings is largely in the 
hands of the European Commission, which is also in charge of the general programming and 
project management.  
Since the launch of the Barcelona process the size of the budget allocation under the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership (MEDA) programme was €3,424 million of grants for 1995-99 and 
€5,350 million for 2000-06. The European Investment Bank offers loans for slightly larger 
amounts. Some 90% of the MEDA funds are for bilateral actions, with the remainder for sub-
regional and regional projects.  
The MEDA regulation established the principles of political and economic conditionality. 
Funding can be suspended in the case of a violation of democratic principles and the rule of law, 
as well as human rights and fundamental freedoms. In a number of cases the EU has reacted to 
such violations by modulating the allocation of funds without activating the formal provisions of 
the regulation. The allocations may be influenced by ‘progress towards structural reform’. But 
overall these potentially important conditionality provisions have hardly been activated. 
Euro-Mediterranean institutions have also developed among parliaments, economic actors and 
civil societies. The activity of the Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Forum, launched in 1998, 
has led foreign ministers in April 2002 to recommend the creation of a Euro-Med Parliamentary 
Assembly, as proposed by European Parliament.  
These mechanisms of the Barcelona process are not going to be replaced by the ENP. As explained 
below, the idea is rather that the ENP should enrich the content and operationality of the Association 
Agreements.
3 
1.2 Assessment 
The scope of action, ambition and achievements of the Barcelona process have received mixed 
reviews.
4 On the positive side, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership is the only political institution 
in the region “where competence, legitimacy and resources are present”.
5 The several other 
attempts to bring together countries from different sides of the Mediterranean have been either 
still-born or quickly disbanded, or have no other ambition than developing dialogue and 
consultation.
6  
                                                   
3 A comprehensive official update on the Barcelona process is available in the Presidency Conclusions for the 
Euro-Mediterranean Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, The Hague, 29-30 November 2004, European 
Council, 14869/04 (Presse 331). 
4 There is considerable literature evaluating the Barcelona process, including: E. Philippart (2003), op.cit.; D. 
Schmidt, Optimiser le processus de Barcelone, Institute for Security Studies, Paris, 2002; Institut Catala de la 
Mediterrania, Ideas to Relaunch the Barcelona Process, Barcelona, 2001; Bertelsmann Foundation, Europe, the 
Mediterranean and the Middle East: Strengthening Responsibility for Stability and Development, Gütersloh, 
Germany, 2002; and EUROMESCO, R. Albioni, F. Ammor and A. de Vasconcelos (eds), Integration et securité 
dans l’éspace euro-méditerraneen, Instituto Estudios Estragicos Internationalais, Lisbon, 2002.  
5 See H.G. Brauch, “The Mediterranean Space and Boundaries” in M. Antonion and H.G. Brauch (eds), The 
Mediterranean space and its borders: Geography, politics, economics and environment, Collection Strademend 
No. 14, Madrid, UNISC, 2001. 
6 The ‘5+5’ West Mediterranean Forum (a 1990 French initiative regrouping five southern European countries – 
France, Italy, Malta, Portugal and Spain – and the five Arab Maghreb Union countries – Algeria, Libya, 
Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia) was frozen in 1992 but relaunched in 2001 by Portugal. See S. Calleya and 
M. Heller, The Restructuring of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership After EU Enlargement: The Logic of 
Subregionalism, EUROMESCO Working Group Report, Lisbon, 2003. 4 | EMERSON & NOUTCHEVA 
 
The EMP’s shortcomings are well-known: relative complexity, limited visibility and popular 
legitimacy. The multilateral, bilateral and unilateral dimensions of the EMP architecture are 
relatively complex. Nonetheless, the EMP displays relatively good institutional performance by 
comparison with alternative schemes in the region and elsewhere. It has reduced uncertainty and 
lengthened ‘the shadow of the future’ (i.e. functioning as a repeated game, it creates an incentive 
to abide by agreements). This is owing to the presence of coordinating bodies, the frequency of 
the meetings, its openness to new categories of public actors and opportunities to play 
simultaneously at multilateral and bilateral levels. It is also because the EU assumes leadership of 
the EMP and controls the finance.  
The EU proposed – and to some extent imposed – an intervention logic that put great emphasis 
on economic liberalisation and opening with international trade. The EMP policy mix espousing 
both economic and political liberalism, combined with a developmental agenda centred on 
poverty reduction, is very much in line with the approaches of the IMF and the World Bank (the 
Washington consensus). 
The Barcelona declaration embraced no fewer than 39 branches of policy, listed in Box 1. The 
scope of action has been criticised for being too wide. According to an evaluation by Philippart, 
the strongest performance appears in the economic and cultural sectors, and the weakest in the 
political and security spheres.
7 The long list of economic sectors included in the 39 lines of 
Barcelona activity is a reflection of the agenda of the EU’s own single market. For most of these 
headings the agreements do not specify operationally precise and binding commitments, but 
rather weakly suggest that there should be ‘cooperation’ in the field in question.  
The  trade policy field is that with the most important operational and legally binding 
commitments. The general target is to complete a free trade area by 2010 across the whole of the 
region. Each of the bilateral Association Agreements contains a tariff reduction schedule in line 
with this objective. These schedules are being followed more or less, but the 2010 objective will 
not be completely met (e.g. Egypt’s Association Agreement only entered into force in 2004, prior 
to which the tariff reduction schedule for 12 to 15 years could not begin). The issue concerning 
rules of origin has been subject to recent advances with agreement in 2001 that the whole of the 
region would move to adopt the pan-European rules, and so become a region with ‘diagonal 
cumulation’ possibilities among Barcelona partners and other non-EU member states in Europe 
that apply the same system.  
Going beyond free trade towards deeper market integration foreign ministers decided in April 
2002 at Valencia to launch the EuroMed Internal Market Programme, and this links to much of 
the substance of the ENP Action Plans, which as detailed below are in many fields aiming at 
harmonisation with EU norms and standards rather than just loose cooperation.  
The MEDA programme for grant aid, while endowed from the beginning with substantial funds, 
was notoriously slow in execution in the first years. Since then the Commission has for its part 
made a serious effort to effect management changes, including the separation of the aid executive 
(EuropAid) from the policy function (DG for External Relations), and considerable 
decentralisation of project management to the Commission delegations in the region.  
A main frustration has been the work in the security domain to develop confidence-building 
measures, including the draft of the Euro-Mediterranean Charter for Peace and Stability, intended 
to institutionalise political dialogue among partners as well as establish crisis prevention and 
crisis management procedures. An agreement was reached on the contents of the draft Charter in 
2000. In light of the collapse of the Middle East peace process, however, foreign ministers 
decided in November 2000 to defer its adoption sine die.  
                                                   
7 E. Philippart (2003), op.cit.  FROM BARCELONA PROCESS TO NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY | 5 
 
 
Box 1. Policy domains engaged by the Barcelona process 
Political and security partnership 
1.  Human rights and freedoms  
2.  State-civil society relations   
3.  Public administration   
4.  Terrorism     
5.  Drugs, crime, corruption   
6.  Civil protection     
7.  Non-proliferation (WMD)   
8.  Defence     
9.  Crisis prevention     
Economic and financial partnership 
10. Trade in goods and services  
11. Customs policy     
12. Competition policy    
13. Investment policy     
14. Banking     
15. Industrial policy     
16. Regulatory policy     
17. Employment policy    
18. Tourism     
19. Energy policy     
20. Science and technology   
21. Environment & water policy  
22. Agricultural policy     
23. Fisheries policy     
24. Transport     
25. Telecommunications & IT   
26. Statistics     
27. Macro-economic policy   
28. Budgetary policy     
29. External debt     
Social, cultural and human affairs 
30. Culture     
31. Cultural heritage     
32. Religion     
33. Education and training   
34. Audio-visual sector    
35. Illegal immigration    
36. Migration policy     
37. Social policy     
38. Youth policy     
39. Health sector 
Source: Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an Association between the European Communities and their 
Member States, of the one part, and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, of the other part, OJ L 129/3, signed 
24.11.97. 6 | EMERSON & NOUTCHEVA 
 
In the field of human rights, the Barcelona process provides institutional infrastructure and 
mechanisms, but these have hardly been used so far, notably invocation of Art. 2 of the 
Association Agreements, which provides the legal base for appropriate measures in the event of 
serious breach of international human rights standards. There has been no systematic procedure 
or attempt to include human rights concerns in the implementation of reform programmes. There 
are no coherent mechanisms or procedures to benchmark and monitor the human rights 
performance of the partner country.
8  
Cooperation over terrorism and illegal immigration is already rising on the Barcelona agenda, as 
seen in the orientations adopted at the Valencia meeting of foreign ministers in April 2002, which 
is a positive indication of the ability of the partnership system to take on new and sensitive 
challenges. 
Finally, there is the issue of the geographic scope of the Barcelona process and the possible use 
of subsidiary groups for closer cooperation. This involves at least three distinct issues: the extent 
of the Barcelona group, its sub-regional formats as for the Maghreb and Mashreq groups and its 
‘advance guard’ variant as in the Agadir group of like-minded but not necessarily contiguous 
states (Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt and Jordan). 
On the issue of scope, there is the question of whether it would have been better to include other 
Arab states and/or to exclude Israel. The present judgement on the EU side is that Barcelona 
should not be converted into a renewed Euro-Arab dialogue by including the Gulf States and non-
Mediterranean African Arab states. This is justified on the grounds of not making the group even 
more unwieldy and heterogeneous, and that the EU-Gulf Cooperation Council relationship seems 
to have found a convenient format. However, the question of Iraq’s inclusion in either the 
Barcelona process or the Gulf Cooperation Council may be posed as and when the situation there 
normalises.  
On the issue of sub-regional groups – Mashreq, Maghreb and Agadir – there are open issues of 
choice, on how much weight the Barcelona process should give to promoting or accompanying 
sub-regionalism versus work at the plenary Barcelona level. If the sub-regional level is selected, 
there is a further choice to be made between the geographic Mashreq and Maghreb groups versus 
the ‘like-minded’ Agadir group. All these options are possible under the Barcelona umbrella. Yet, 
so far the Arab Maghreb Union has been stalled by the unresolved Saharan conflict, while 
Mashreq cooperation has been even more severely blocked by the stalled Middle East peace 
process. Nevertheless, if a positive solution to the Israeli-Arab conflict becomes feasible there 
should be an important Mashreq regional dimension to the solution. 
Overall assessment of the Barcelona process. If the standard of assessment were that the 
Barcelona process should have already been transforming the region’s economic and political 
trends, then it has not succeeded. The economic performance of the region has stagnated and its 
relative performance in relation to Central and Eastern Europe and most of Asia has deteriorated. 
Political reform has also been almost non-existent. Societal trends, for example tendencies in 
favour of radical Islam, are deeply worrying.  
If the standard were whether or not the Barcelona process has created a constructive political and 
institutional infrastructure of comprehensive partnership between the region and Europe, which 
has the potential to be built upon and further strengthened in the early decades of the 21
st century, 
then Barcelona has already made considerable achievements.  
The EU’s initiative is surely not in the category of a strategic mistake that has had unexpected 
and counter-productive effects, such as causing conflict, destabilising societies or aggravating 
                                                   
8 See I. Byrne and C. Shamas, Human Rights Implications of the MEDA programmes, Euro-Mediterranean 
Human Rights Network, Copenhagen, 2003. FROM BARCELONA PROCESS TO NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY | 7 
 
tensions between the European and Arab communities. This is not an empty remark, given the 
political tensions generated by American policies in much of the region. On the contrary, 
relations between the EU and its partners are relatively cordial and constructive, and thus provide 
a plausible foundation for a deepened relationship.  
2.  The European Neighbourhood Policy so far 
The EU started developing a new neighbourhood policy as soon as the big enlargement from 15 
to 25 member states was becoming virtually certain, and when as a result minds began to focus 
on what this would mean for the ‘new neighbours’. Initially concerns were expressed for three 
northern neighbours, Belarus, Moldova and especially Ukraine. But when the debate among 
foreign ministers and the Commission started to become serious the Mediterranean member 
states voiced their concern that the south should not be relatively disadvantaged in any new 
initiative. In policy documents published in March 2003 and May 2004, the territorial ambitions 
of the initiative were progressively expanded to embrace all the European members of the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) to the north and east and all the Mediterranean states 
of the Barcelona process. The title ‘Wider Europe’ was discarded in favour of European 
Neighbourhood Policy.  
The Commission initially gave the responsibility for developing the policy to a task force mainly 
staffed from the Directorate-General for Enlargement, although this is now changed under the 
new Commission, with responsibility passed on to the Directorate-General for External Relations. 
Nevertheless, the initial link to the enlargement staff in the Commission had an evident impact on 
the content and method of the ENP even though it was clearly stated that the ENP does not imply 
a membership prospect. Like the accession negotiation process, the method was to be essentially 
bilateral and differentiated according to the ambitions and capabilities of the individual partner 
states. This has translated into the drawing up of Action Plans for each partner state, whose 
structure was derived from the standard agenda of the accession negotiation process. This meant 
a comprehensive set of chapters, covering in the first place the Copenhagen political criteria for 
democracy and human rights, going on to cover the subjects of the acquis, i.e. EU norms for the 
four freedoms of movement of goods, services, capital and labour, further extended with the law 
of the single market policy, and finally sectoral policies that have a significant legal or financial 
content. Box 2 lists the chapters of the bilateral Action Plans, taking the example of Jordan. There 
are differences in the precise agendas for each partner state, but the general structure is the same 
for all. In the case of Jordan there are 38 chapter headings, which further break down into 260 
bulleted action points or programmes.  
While this huge list of desiderata is a modified transplant of the accession negotiation agenda, it 
is a political principle of the process that these are jointly agreed and jointly owned agendas. 
Looking at some of the details of the bulleted action points it is evident that the standard agenda 
has been screened by the partner state, so as to import references to relevant national policies and 
plans. Where there is an identifiable national policy the reference is made. Where this is not the 
case there is either a general recipe of reform in the direction of conventional thinking (e.g. the 
Washington consensus doctrine) or alignment on EU norms.  
Given the virtually encyclopaedic agenda, the degree of specification of many of the bulleted 
action points is short and banal, as shown by the examples of “Continue progress with the 
privatisation programme” or “Strengthen banking regulation and supervision”.
9 
 
                                                   
9 See European Commission, EU/Jordan Action Plan, Brussels, 9 December 2004. 8 | EMERSON & NOUTCHEVA 
 
A main difference with the Barcelona agreements, however, is the considerable switch in 
emphasis moving on from the vague intention to cooperate on the prescription of harmonisation 
with EU norms and standards, or at least converging towards them, such as: 
Establish a binding, uniform definition of state aid which is compatible with that of the EU…[or]  
Establish a list of priority sectors for Jordan to participate in the EU internal market…[or] 
Draw up a list of measures for gradual legislative approximation towards the principles of EU 
legislation (in sanitary and phytosanitary food safety domains).
 10 
Box 2. Chapter headings of the ENP Action Plan for Jordan 
1. Enhanced political dialogue and reform 
  Democracy and the rule of law 
  Human rights and fundamental freedoms 
  Cooperation on foreign and security policy 
  Regional conflict prevention and crisis management 
2. Economic and social reform and development 
  Monetary, exchange rate and fiscal policies 
  Functioning of the market economy 
  Social situation, employment and poverty reduction 
 Regional  development 
 Sustainable  development   
3. Trade-related issues, market and regulatory reform 
 Movement  of  goods 
 Trade  relations 
 Customs 
  Technical regulations, standards (harmonised EU areas) 
  Administrative procedures (non-harmonised EU areas) 
  Sanitary and phytosanitary issues 
  Right of establishment, company law, services, etc. 
  Movement of capital and current payments 
 Movement  of  persons 
 Regional  cooperation 
  Other key areas 
 Taxation 
 Competition  policy 
 Intellectual  property 
 Statistics 
 Enterprise  policy 
  Public financial control 
4. Cooperation in justice and home affairs  
 Migration  issues 
 Border  management 
  Fight against organised crime 
 Drugs 
 Money  laundering 
 Combating  terrorism 
                                                   
10 Ibid. FROM BARCELONA PROCESS TO NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY | 9 
 
5. Transport, energy, information society and environment 
 Transport 
 Energy 
 Information  society 
 Environment 
  Science and technology, research  
6. People-to-people contacts 
  Education, training and youth 
  Culture and audio-visual issues 
 Public  health 
Source: European Commission (2004a). 
 
More precisely, the main differences seen in the draft Action Plan (for Jordan) compared with the 
(1997 Jordanian) Association Agreement are: 
•  The democracy and human rights agenda is far more developed. 
•  Cooperation in foreign and security policy and conflict resolution is a new feature. 
•  In trade policy little is added to the free trade plan set out in the agreement. 
•  In the internal market domain a lot of prescriptions for policy reform, development and 
alignment with EU standards are introduced in the Action Plan. 
•  The transport and energy policy domains are much more detailed and specific, which also 
advocate EU standards or regulatory approaches. 
•  In the justice and home affairs domain the Action Plan is much more developed, whereas the 
agreement went little beyond vague intentions to cooperate. 
These developments largely match the evolution of the EU’s own policy competences since 
1997.  
The Action Plans will be layered on top of the existing Association Agreements, rather than 
replacing them. There is thus important material that is not repeated in the Action Plans, such as 
the free trade timetable of commitments and the general institutional and procedural provisions. 
There is no new drafting on the political conditionality, which is carried over from the 
Association Agreement. This means the standard formula found in all EU external association 
agreements was used, with a linkage between two articles. A first article states the common 
commitment of the two parties to democracy and human rights, and a later one says that if one 
party fails in its obligations the other party may take “appropriate measures”. This highly 
diplomatic formulation is generally interpreted to mean that the EU could withdraw advantages 
under the agreement (e.g. trade or aid) in the event of serious default over political commitments, 
and in an extreme case the EU could suspend the agreement. This has never been done, however, 
in the history of the Barcelona process.  
An effort is made in the Action Plan to open up perspectives for an ongoing dynamic in the 
relationship, with a section outlining “New Partnership Perspectives”, which is summarised in 
Box 3 using the case of Jordan. The idea is to offer prospects for positive evolution under all 
headings: trade, market integration, aid, sectoral policy cooperation and the 
institutional/contractual relationship. A notable absentee on this list is the prospect for 
liberalisation on the movement of persons (visas or migration). None of the positive prospects are 
defined in operational or legally binding terms. This means that the whole issue of incentives and 
conditionality is left hanging in the air. We thus return to this issue more systematically below. 10 | EMERSON & NOUTCHEVA 
 
Box 3. Priorities and incentives in the Action Plan for Jordan 
Priorities for action 
Political 
National dialogue on democracy  
Independent judiciary 
Further freedom of expression and media 
Equal treatment of women 
Political dialogue, e.g. on the peace process and terrorism 
Economic 
Measures to enhance growth and investment 
Further liberalisation of trade 
Progressive liberalisation of services 
Management of migration and some visa facilitation 
Sustainable development, poverty reduction 
Develop economic infrastructure networks 
Cooperation on science and technology  
New partnership prospects 
Political and institutional 
Upgrade of political cooperation 
Enhance institutional cooperation between administrations with sub-committees 
New contractual arrangements to be considered in due time 
Economic 
A significant degree of economic integration, including a stake in the EU’s internal market 
Convergence of economic legislation and reduction of barriers  
Deepening trade relations, extended progressively to cover agriculture and services 
Aid and other 
Increased financial support with new neighbourhood instrument and EIB 
Technical assistance 
Reinforced cooperation in several domains: cultural, educational, environment, etc. 
 
Source: European Commission (2004a).  
3.  Lessons from Central and Eastern Europe and the Western Balkans 
The process of Europeanisation in Central and Eastern Europe and the Western Balkans has been 
driven by the EU membership conditionality. At the European summit in Copenhagen in 1993, 
EU member states defined the conditions that an aspiring candidate should meet before it could 
be invited to become a full EU member.
11 The goal of fulfilling EU pre-accession requirements, 
known as the Copenhagen criteria (see Box 4), has set the reform agenda of governments for 
these two regional groups of countries. The EU-formulated set of conditions and the promise of 
membership attached to it has been the main driver of change in the pre-accession countries. 
                                                   
11  See the Copenhagen European Council Presidency Conclusions (European Council, 1993). FROM BARCELONA PROCESS TO NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY | 11 
 
 
Box 4. The Copenhagen criteria 
Membership criteria require that the candidate country must have achieved: 
•  stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and 
protection of minorities;  
•  the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive 
pressure and market forces within the Union; and 
•  the ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of political, 
economic & monetary union.  
Source: European Council (1993). 
 
The Copenhagen political and economic criteria act as powerful motors of democratization and 
economic reform with the EU as the centre of gravity.
12 In an ideal case, they generate synergetic 
benefits. Gains from trade and inward investment may east the politics of the democratic 
transition. The credibility of the ongoing democratic transition should enhance the quality and 
perceived reliability of the investment climate. This dynamic is in essence a double, interactive, 
politico-economic gravity model, strengthened by the notion of anchorage. 
The Europeanisation process was set in motion in Central and Eastern Europe in the early 1990s 
and in the Western Balkans in 2000. The countries operating in this European field of gravity 
have been converging on EU democracy and market economy standards with various speeds. The 
results to date are reflected in each country’s relationship with the EU in terms of its closeness to 
EU accession (Table 1). From the pre-accession cases, we have three categories. The first one 
comprises Bulgaria and Romania, both leftovers from the May 2004 wave of EU enlargement 
and both granted a conditional accession date of 2007. Both countries have now completed 
accession negotiations and are expected to sign the Accession Treaty in early 2005. The second 
category consists of candidate countries that are not yet negotiating accession. Turkey and 
Croatia fall under this rubric, with Turkey awaiting the green light for the start of accession talks 
and Croatia expecting the official launch of accession negotiations. The third category is made up 
of the potential candidates in the Western Balkans, who have not yet been granted candidacy and 
who either have negotiated or are in the process of negotiating, or are about to start negotiating a 
Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the EU. Their prospects for full membership are 
long-term ones. The fourth and fifth categories reflect a continuum of EU aspirations and 
prospects with countries further to the north and south. The European CIS states and 
Mediterranean partner states are officially grouped together in the same neighbourhood policy, 
yet the European CIS states are able to claim that they could be eligible candidates for accession, 
whereas this claim cannot credibly be made by the North African and Middle East states. 
Bulgaria and Romania, two of the most Sovietised of the former communist states of Central and 
Eastern Europe, opted as clearly and quickly as any other country from the region to claim their 
place as EU accession candidates. But they needed more time to reach Copenhagen criteria 
standards. The EU conditionality played a critical role not only in steering the transition towards 
democracy and a market economy but also in mobilising the two countries to reform faster, so as 
to eventually catch up with the front-runners from Central and Eastern Europe. Their exclusion 
from the first wave of enlargement and the subsequent pressure on them to accelerate the pace of 
pre-accession preparations motivated their leaderships to undertake decisive steps in order to 
shape up and not miss the promised accession date of 2007. The Bulgarian and Romanian cases 
                                                   
12 See M. Emerson and G. Noutcheva, Europeanisation as a Gravity Model of Democratisation, CEPS Working 
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may thus be summarised as two examples where EU political conditionality was very real, 
resulting in a delayed accession timetable, where the formal institutions of democratic 
governance were not in question, but where the quality of governance and the rule of law was 
judged unsatisfactory by the EU until a set of remedial measures were taken.  
Table 1. Categories of countries according their prospects for EU accession 
Description Countries 
1. EU candidate negotiating accession  
(pre-accession) 
Bulgaria, Romania 
2. EU candidate not negotiating accession 
(pre-pre-accession) 
Turkey, Croatia 
3. Potential EU candidate 
(pre-pre-pre-accession) 
Serbia and Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Macedonia, Albania 
4. Non-EU candidate with accession aspirations  Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia  
5. Non-EU candidate with no accession chances  Morocco, Tunisia, etc.  
 
The current Europeanisation and democratisation of Turkey is the most dramatic movement on 
the European frontline.
13 For a long time the EU refused to take the long-standing Turkish 
candidacy seriously. At the Helsinki European summit in 1999 the EU changed course and 
decided to admit Turkey to the next stage of the pre-accession process – with an invitation to start 
accession negotiations – on the condition that it fulfilled the Copenhagen political criteria. This 
has acted as a catalyst for the domestic transformation of Turkey to achieve Western-standard 
democratisation – a profound process of political and societal modernisation that it found difficult 
to complete in the last couple of decades without the EU anchorage. What is instructive in the 
Turkish case is the fact that the measures undertaken in response to the EU’s criticisms of the 
Turkish state of democracy, ranging from changes in the constitution to detailed policy reforms in 
relation to human rights, the role of the military, the quality of the judiciary and the treatment of 
minorities (in particular but not only the Kurds), have been passed with the political mandate of 
the Islamists in government, the AKP party. While everyone in the West feared the ascendance to 
power of an Islamist political formation in Ankara, the AKP leaders have proven the sceptics 
wrong and have engaged in the most powerful process of reforms conceivable in the last three 
years. This has resulted in sufficient progress towards meeting the Copenhagen criteria for the 
Commission to have recommended the opening of accession negotiations, with a positive 
decision by the European Council on 16-17 December 2004. 
The cases of Serbia and Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina, two of the potential 
candidates from the Western Balkans, are examples of EU conditionality aiming at state-building 
in addition to democratisation and economic modernisation. Both countries are precarious 
common states with weak central governments and complex power-sharing mechanisms between 
their constitutive units – the two entities (Republika Srpska and the Muslim-Croat Federation) in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and the two republics in Serbia and Montenegro. The objective of the 
EU policy is to strengthen the two union states and avoid further disintegration in the region by 
taming the secessionist drive of sub-state units. Progress to date has been mixed. Bosnia and 
Herzegovina has made some important steps in endowing the state-level institutions with more 
competences, most notably in the area of taxation and defence. At the same time, differences 
between Serbia and Montenegro regarding the raison d’étre of their state union and the function 
                                                   
13 This section on Turkey draws heavily on F. Keyman and S. Aydin, European Integration and the 
Transformation of Turkish Democracy, CEPS EU-Turkey Working Paper No. 2, CEPS, Brussels, August 2004 
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of the common institutions have grown even further. The Bosnian case is interesting not only 
because it is a successful state-building example but also because of the transformation taking 
place at the level of political elites. The nationalists who were until recently obstructing all efforts 
of the international community to move the country forward, are progressively changing their 
behaviour because they realise that compliance with EU conditions eventually leads to real 
statehood. In Serbia and Montenegro, however, it is the reformers who object to the EU’s 
statehood-linked conditions and this leaves the EU with no reliable partners in the domestic 
political context to advance the democracy and market economy agenda. The EU conditionality 
in this case has backfired and the EU has had to relax its initial demands on economic 
harmonisation between the two republics in order to avoid damaging the democratisation and 
economic reform prospects in Serbia and Montenegro. The lessons from these two cases may be 
borne in mind when the EU devises its conditionality policy vis-à-vis the Palestinian Authority, 
for instance, where the statehood incentive could prove to be a powerful driver for change.  
It is possible to see this continuum of relationships between the EU and its periphery extending to 
the fourth and fifth levels suggested in Table 1. The northern ENP partners are next in line, given 
that they mostly aspire to EU membership in the long run, even if this is not acknowledged by the 
EU. Whether the southern ENP partners should be regarded as being in the same category or in a 
fifth one for non-European countries is itself a highly sensitive question. Official EU policy has 
all these states starting as equal partner states, but this still provides for differentiation, and the 
willingness to embrace all the political Copenhagen criteria is already an important 
differentiating factor as between Council of Europe member states of the north and the 
Mediterranean states in the south.  
4.  Main issues for the EU’s strategy 
4.1  Conditionality and socialisation  
Conditionality generates domestic change in partner countries through altering the opportunity 
structure of political actors willing to reform. Through providing conditional support for reform 
in targeted domains, the EU can act as a key driver of change. Domestic transformation is a 
response to the material and social benefits offered by the EU, such as financial and technical 
assistance, institutional ties, market access and political dialogue.  
Socialisation is the other mechanism of influencing the patterns of change in a partner country in 
the direction of Europeanisation. It may be defined as a process of inducing behavioural and 
identity change through interaction with the partner at any or all levels (e.g. government, 
business, civil society and students), which results in social learning, model emulation, lessons 
drawn, etc. 
The EU policy vis-à-vis the enlargement countries has been actively employing both 
conditionality and socialisation and the two mechanisms have successfully complemented each 
other. In Central and Eastern Europe and the Balkans, however, the EU also put the mega-
incentive of membership on the table. Thus all socialisation activities have been taking place 
against the background of the expected future membership of the candidates and in the 
institutional context of the Accession Partnership, involving dense institutional contacts between 
Brussels and the capitals of would-be members.  
Categories of conditionality as drivers of change 
A key issue for the EU’s European Neighbourhood Policy strategy is to work out what 
mechanisms of change to employ with regard to the ENP partner countries. If a conditionality 
model is favoured, there are open questions to address. So far the EU has not been specific 14 | EMERSON & NOUTCHEVA 
 
concerning many of the prospective incentives (such as ‘a stake in the internal market’), nor are 
the linkages between conditions and incentives explicit. We identify three broad categories of 
conditionality as follows. 
Normal sectoral policy conditionality.  The term ‘normal’ sectoral policy conditionality is 
suggested since there is a complex of working methods that are common practice for the major 
external actors (US and EU) and multilateral agencies (the IMF, World Bank, European 
Investment Bank and the WTO). As Box 5 shows, this can relate to every category of incentive 
offered to partner states. The EU’s Neighbourhood Policy, grafted onto the top of the Barcelona 
process, will be involved in all the traditional types of aid and trade policies, to which may be 
added the increasingly important category of openness to the movement of people through visa 
and migration policies.  
Box 5. Examples of sectoral policy conditionality 
•  Macro-economic aid is conventionally subject to strictly macro-economic conditions (the EU 
typically co-finances IMF programmes with the same conditions).  
•  Project assistance may be conditioned on the bankable quality of the proposed projects (European 
Investment Bank practice).  
•  Programme aid may be conditioned on the quality of the relevant sectoral policies (e.g. World Bank 
practice).  
•  The amount of technical assistance may be conditioned on an assessment of the quality of the 
partner’s reform programmes and availability of adequate partners. 
•  Humanitarian grant assistance is conditioned on the gravity of natural catastrophes or post-conflict 
situations. 
•  Trade concessions may be conditioned first on WTO accession, then on the quality of trade policy 
and customs administrations and reciprocal concessions on the way to free trade.  
•  Internal market access is conditioned on the adoption of EU-compliant regulatory standards.  
•  For the movement of people, visa regimes may be liberalised on closely related conditions, such as 
the quality of border controls of the partner state and re-admission agreements. 
•  Migration policies may be liberalised as a function of the skill qualities of the migrants.  
 
 
What can be said against this background about the conditionality package of the ENP? The 
conditions, if they exist, have to be defined by the actions agreed in the Action Plan, which for 
Jordan has 260 items that are summarised under 13 explicitly identified priority groups (see Box 
3). The choice is for a balanced mix of the political and economic priorities, which are quite 
wide-ranging in both cases. The incentives on offer, although only vaguely defined, are also wide 
ranging: political and institutional incentives, economic market access and aid.  
What should the partner state expect? One might suppose that the political conditions would 
govern the political perspectives for a deepened relationship and the economic conditions would 
govern the availability of aid and market access. But that would be speculation at this point. One 
impression is that there is currently a debate going on about these issues within the EU 
institutions and between them and the member states, which has not yet reached a conclusion. 
Another impression is that the EU system as a whole tends to prefer a loosely defined set of rules, 
leaving maximum degrees of freedom for action in light of the circumstances in different 
countries and in different, wider international contexts. Individual member states in some cases 
wish to retain a degree of freedom for their own bilateral actions, hoping that EU policy can be 
generally supportive. This interpretation seems plausible and understandable. Yet this lack of FROM BARCELONA PROCESS TO NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY | 15 
 
clarity undermines the chances that the EU as a whole may achieve effective leverage on the 
evolutions in the partner states. The first rule of conditionality policy is indeed that the conditions 
should be clear, consistent and credible.  
Maybe in some areas this lack of explicit treatment in the Action Plans is not a serious problem. 
For macroeconomic aid the IMF rulebook is well established. For project lending, criteria on 
bankability and cost-benefit analysis are equally firmly established. Elsewhere, however, there 
are big uncertainties for the partner state over the conditions for the activation of incentives. This 
is true for the traditional trade policy area, where the conditions for EU liberalisation are not 
clear. For example, for agricultural produce the need to conform to food health and phytosanitary 
standards may be necessary conditions for market opening, but perhaps not sufficient ones. What 
else is needed? For integration into the internal market the nature of the possible incentives and 
the conditions are not clearly laid out. For visa restrictions and migration rules, the conditions of 
possible liberalisation are also unclear.  
Negative conditionality – from sanctions to war. The attempt to use sanctions to encourage 
changes in political behaviour or regimes is not irrelevant, even if the ENP is seen as a positive 
policy. Libya is the current example of the withdrawal of sanctions, in exchange for scrapping 
plans for weapons of mass destruction and abstaining from sponsoring terrorist acts as in the past. 
Indeed, Libya can now have the prospect of moving relatively fast from its recently sanctioned 
‘pariah’ status into the normal favours of the Barcelona process and the ENP.  
EU policies also have to work alongside US policies in the broader Middle East, with the US 
retaining sanctions against Iran, whereas the EU is offering the positive incentive of a Trade and 
Cooperation Agreement based on conditions relating to nuclear non-proliferation. Coherence here 
is surely vital to achieving a driving force towards common objectives.  
The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq also have to be borne in mind. These may be the only cases for 
some time of war and military occupation as instruments of the imposition of democracy. While 
the EU is hardly going to lead such engagements, its member states have almost all been involved 
in Afghanistan and some in Iraq. The important analytical issue here for the EU and the US is 
whether these wars are turning out to advance the objectives of reform in the Arab world at large 
or to aggravate the negative driving forces represented by radical and terrorist Islamic factions 
and movements. If radical Islam is gaining ground in much of the Mashreq region, boosted by 
adverse reactions to the Iraqi war and the unsettled Israeli-Palestinian conflict, this makes the 
strategic objectives of the ENP all the more an uphill struggle.  
Positive conditionality and incentives into overdrive. The question here is whether it is possible 
for the ENP, in the absence of the mega-incentive of EU accession, to conceive of mechanisms 
whereby the play of ‘normal’ sectoral incentives and conditions could combine with synergy in 
overarching political incentives to achieve the strategic objectives of transforming the partner 
states.  
The EU could offer additional financial support to countries that are willing to reform faster and 
deeper. It has proposed a doubling of grant funds over the period 2006-13 for the entire ENP 
region (but this may be substantially scaled back in negotiations with member states). Increased 
aid could be combined with the competitive peer-pressure method, whereby the additional aid 
could be made available to countries achieving the best evaluation marks on reforms. This idea 
has featured in some speeches (e.g. by former Commissioner Chris Patten) but has not been 
developed into a real policy proposal.  
It is worth mentioning, however, that it was not the EU’s financial resources but rather the 
prospect of EU membership that motivated Eastern European leaders to reform. Scepticism 
remains as to ‘how much reform the EU can buy’, through putting additional financial resources 
on the table.  16 | EMERSON & NOUTCHEVA 
 
There has been a lot of emphasis in the ENP strategic documents on the ‘joint ownership’ of the 
process between the EU and the partner country. This applies not only to the joint setting of 
reform priorities but also to the monitoring of the implementation of the Action Plans. In essence, 
this means that the EU will be constrained in penalising underperformance. The positive 
conditionality model seems to provide the only alternative choice for the EU.  
On the other hand there are a number of cases that suggest that the overarching framework of the 
ENP has serious political potential for at least some of the partner states. First, for some of the 
southern ENP partner states, such as Morocco (which made a bid to become a candidate for 
accession some decades ago) or Tunisia, their interest in an advanced model of Euro-
Mediterranean integration even without accession prospects is quite real. The offer of some kind 
of new neighbourhood agreement is therefore of interest.  
Second is the case of Israel, which is capable of becoming a member of the European Economic 
Area and a full participant in many other EU policies, and would like to do so for profound 
political and societal reasons. The Action Plan is already pointing in this direction and resolution 
of the conflict with the Palestinians would fully open up this possibility.  
Third, for Palestinians the incentives are existential – the pursuit of full sovereign statehood, 
territory and means of material subsistence. The EU is well placed in principle to work with these 
incentives. It is a major financial donor to the Palestinian Authority and is also a party to the 
Quartet process, which should have the role of multilateral midwife to a political solution to the 
conflict. The EU has already had a significant role in the political and economic conditionality 
being brought to bear upon the Palestinian Authority, in various combinations with the US, the 
IMF and the World Bank.  
Fourth, there are the more distant but still highly important developments in the northern ENP 
states. Both Georgia and now Ukraine have made the big political breaks with their ‘rose’ and 
‘orange’ revolutions. It now remains to be seen how the northern ENP can help consolidate these 
developments. Autocratic leaderships in the southern ENP regions may be fearful of these 
demonstration cases in the community of neighbourhood states. But civil society may receive 
serious encouragement from them. Indeed, this precisely seems to be happening now in Lebanon, 
triggered by the assassination of the former prime minister in February 2005. 
Fifth, as a general point, the recent history of the accession negotiations has revealed the 
emergence of an important driving force, which is the process of competition between the 
candidate states. As some candidates stepped ahead in their convergence on EU norms, the 
laggards took notice and were inspired to intensify their efforts. Is it possible to imagine that 
some analogous inter-ENP partner dynamic could take root? For those using the driver of change 
imagery, can we imagine the package of incentives moving up into overdrive?  
Socialisation as a driver of change  
Undoubtedly, the vagueness of the incentives the EU is willing to offer to the ENP partners limits 
the possibility for a strong conditionality model. Another option for the EU is to rely on a weaker 
conditionality model leaving room for stronger socialisation. The socialisation model is not based 
on reward/punishment logic. Instead of emphasising incentives and disincentives, the EU tries to 
convince the leadership of the ENP Policy countries to adopt EU standards and regulatory norms 
in various policy areas for the sake of boosting their own economic and social development and 
improving their own governance structures. The idea here is to explain and communicate in a 
friendly and persuasive way what the EU’s model of governance is and to propose that partner 
countries learn from it and align with it.  
This method is particularly suitable for exporting the EU’s single market regulatory norms and 
the regulatory approaches adopted in various areas of EU common policy, such as financial FROM BARCELONA PROCESS TO NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY | 17 
 
services, environment, transport and energy. It presupposes a fair amount of diplomatic skill on 
the EU side to persuade the neighbours to see the value of converging on the EU model. This will 
involve a learning process for the partners, by way of which they come to an understanding that it 
is to their own benefit to accept the EU regulatory framework as an anchor.  
The question remains as to how receptive the southern neighbours might be to EU norms and 
regulatory systems. The Central and Eastern European countries were relatively open to new 
ideas about governance methods and practices from the EU because they were in active search of 
a credible model to replace the collapsed old communist system. The demise of communism and 
the successful example of Western Europe combined to make the EU model attractive to Eastern 
European elites and societies. The domestic transformation that followed was an expression of 
the general will and the national consensus in these countries about ‘returning to Europe’. The 
EU model thus enjoyed a very high degree of legitimacy that was further reinforced by the 
promise of membership. 
In the south, the EU is confronted with the challenge of persuading countries that are further 
away from the European core geographically, politically and economically of the virtues of 
political and economic liberalism, EU-style. Resistance to EU-promoted ideas and methods will 
undoubtedly be greater. This is an additional reason for the EU to engage in an intense dialogue 
with its neighbours on the substance of various policy ideas rather than try to impose a vision on 
them of how they should develop. For socialisation to succeed, the perceived legitimacy of the 
persuader is key, as is the set of norms the persuader stands for.  
The US has similar models to offer when it comes to regulatory frameworks, although its more 
aggressive and forceful methods of foreign policy have led to resistance in the Arab world. The 
EU stands a better chance here of proposing a set of norms that could prove acceptable to Arab 
elites. In addition, the European cultural tradition is strong in some parts of the Mediterranean, 
for instance in the Maghreb region, which should give the EU a further degree of credibility. 
4.2  Sequencing of democratic versus economic reforms  
The EU policy vis-à-vis Central and Eastern Europe has favoured the simultaneous promotion of 
political and economic liberalisation across the whole region. In the Western Balkans, the EU has 
so far concentrated in the first place on state consolidation and institution-building – a third layer 
of problems superimposed on the initial political and economic conditions in the region. But 
because the Western Balkan countries aim at full EU membership, the recipe of double transition 
with incremental improvements on both political and economic governance will be applied.  
The EU faces a completely different task with regard to its southern neighbours, the Arab states 
of the Mediterranean. So far the EU policy has been a textbook example of seeking to promote 
modernisation through economic means, with the Barcelona process giving precedence to 
economic reform. Following in this tradition the first and most obvious candidate for being a 
driver of change is the proposal in the Action Plan to bring the partner states closer to the EU 
internal market. A recent study published under the World Bank/European Commission 
programme regarding the Mediterranean economic infrastructure develops this proposition in 
some depth, and rather convincingly.
14 According to this study, the potential benefits for the 
Mediterranean partner states offered by free trade (which is already programmed) are rather 
modest by comparison with what could be achieved by policy reforms and competitive private-
sector development in the area of ‘backbone services’, such as transport, logistics, financial 
services, telecommunications and electricity, as well as other service sectors that can profit from 
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proximity to the EU market, such as tourism, IT services, business and professional services, and 
distribution. All these services also have to become competitive to give the manufacturing and 
agricultural production sectors a chance to profit from their potential comparative advantage 
(owing to proximity and cheap labour) in relation to the EU market.  
Moreover, the vision of broader politico-economic integration with the EU could in principle 
help overcome interest-group obstacles to reforming micro-economic policies. The first merit of 
the Action Plans is therefore that it opens up this prospect. 
Stimulating political reforms of the authoritarian regimes in the south has not received the same 
policy attention as it did in the case of the former communist dictatorships. A second candidate 
for the EU’s role as a driver is in the field of democracy and human rights. This is displayed in 
the Action Plans in the considerable detail given to these political governance issues compared 
with the previous agreements. Indeed, as Table 2 illustrates, progress towards democracy has 
been virtually zero. Yet the Action Plans, being jointly agreed with the partner state governments, 
are unsurprisingly careful and cautious. Wholesale adoption of the Copenhagen political criteria, 
as for EU accession candidates, is not the model. Rather, the Action Plans identify those elements 
in the existing reform agendas of the partner states that have at least a partial fit with the 
Copenhagen criteria. Thus Jordan undertakes to implement its judicial upgrading strategy, its 
Higher Media Council, etc. Progressive, partial and controllable political reform is the name of 
the game. Whether this will succeed in setting in motion a broader democratising dynamic 
remains to be seen.  
Table 2. Middle East and North Africa: Average ratings of political rights and civil liberties 
Region/country  1973 1983 1993 2000 2003 
       
Maghreb  5.9 5.4 6.0 5.6 5.8 
Algeria  6.0 6.0 6.5 5.5 5.5 
Libya  7.0 6.0 7.0 7.0 7.0 
Morocco  5.0 4.5 5.0 4.5 5.0 
Tunisia  5.5 5.0 5.5 5.5 5.5 
       
Mashreq (excl. Palestine & Israel)  5.3 5.3 5.6 5.5 5.9 
Egypt  6.0 5.0 6.0 5.5 6.0 
Jordan  6.0 6.0 4.0 4.0 5.0 
Lebanon  2.0 4.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 
Syria  7.0 5.5 7.0 7.0 7.0 
Israel  2.5 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 
       
Gulf   5.6 5.5 6.1 5.7 5.7 
Bahrain  5.5 5.0 6.0 6.5 5.0 
Iran  5.5 6.0 6.5 5.5 6.0 
Iraq  7.0 6.5 7.0 5.5 6.0 
Kuwait  3.5 4.0 5.0 4.5 4.5 
Oman  6.5 6.0 6.0 5.5 5.5 
Qatar  5.5 5.0 6.5 6.0 6.0 
Saudi  Arabia  6.0 6.5 7.0 7.0 7.0 
United Arab Emirates  5.5  5.0  6.0  5.5  6.0 
Yemen  5.5 6.0 4.5 5.5 5.0 
Total  average  5.6 5.4 5.9 5.6 5.8 
Note: Country status – 1 to 2.5 = free; 3 to 5 = partly free; 5.5 to 7 = not free. 
Source: Freedom House (2004) (retrieved from http://www.freedomhouse.org/ratings/allscore04.xls). FROM BARCELONA PROCESS TO NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY | 19 
 
While the economies of the southern neighbours have functioned according to market principles 
for some time, most have inadequate regulatory frameworks for a modern competitive 
economy.
15 A comparison between the EU accession countries from Central and Eastern Europe 
(eight of whom are already EU members) and the MEDA countries with regard to their score on a 
synthetic indicator for governance constructed by the World Bank suggests that the southern 
neighbours fall behind in terms of structural and institutional reform underpinning the success of 
the advanced economies nowadays (see Figure 2). 
 
 
Legend: The indicator is an average of the score for six indicators developed by the WB: voice and accountability, 
political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and control of corruption. 
Source: Dodini, M. and M. Fantini (2004), The EU Neighbourhood Policy: Implications for Economic Growth and 
Stability, European Commission, DG for Economic and Financial Affairs, July.  
In any case the time seems now to have come for a recalibration of EU policies in the area of 
democratisation. Even without demanding full compliance with the Copenhagen political criteria, 
the EU could strengthen the democracy emphasis in its relations with the southern neighbours 
through: 
•  willingness to raise issues of human rights and questions of adequate democratisation 
strategies more forcefully in political dialogue;  
•  finer and more coherent application of MEDA aid projects and programmes for improvement 
of human rights protection, governance and civil society development. In the context of 
structural adjustment, greater thought could be given to the conditioning of budgetary support 
to the partner’s respect for human rights in its policies and systematic practices; 
•  systematic consultation with civil society, in particular with movements and organisations 
embedded in society and those working in controversial areas such as civil and political 
rights; and  
•  ensuring that principles of international law are carefully applied and adhered to in the design 
and implementation of EU external policies and engagements.  
                                                   
15 See M. Dodini and M. Fantini, The EU Neighbourhood Policy: Implications for Economic Growth and 
Stability, European Commission, DG for Economic and Financial Affairs, July 2004. 
Figure 1. Governance in the EU neighbourhood 
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The question for the EU to decide is how to promote the double objective of economic and 
political liberalism in its new neighbours. What should be the sequencing of priorities? Should 
the EU continue to push for economic reform with the hope that change will spill over into the 
political domain or should it apply the whole democracy conditionality developed for the 
accession countries? How political should the EU become in the south? Should it follow a 
standard recipe for all southern neighbours or should it tailor its intervention toolkit following an 
analysis of the domestic factors and identification of potential areas for exerting the most 
profound impact?  
4.3  Convergence/divergence of EU and US methods in the region  
The European Security Strategy adopted by the member states at the Copenhagen European 
Council in 2003 signals the EU’s intention to develop its relationship with the rest of the world 
through liberal engagement rather than realist balance of power. The message the EU is sending 
to its neighbours is rather benevolent, promising to engage rather than coerce, pledging to help 
rather than threaten and highlighting inducements rather than punishments. The means through 
which the EU approaches its neighbours are also benign in nature – trade liberalisation, political 
dialogue, institutional ties, financial assistance, etc.  
This approach is in sharp contrast to the international behaviour of the US post-9/11. The US has 
deployed its enormous military power beyond its borders, first in Afghanistan and then in Iraq. 
While the initial target was the al-Qaeda terrorist network in Afghanistan, with the Iraqi war the 
focus shifted through non-proliferation concerns on to the promotion of democracy. Coercing 
nations into democracy through military means runs huge risks of producing more unintended 
consequences than desired, in addition to damaging the normative appeal of American foreign 
policy that has sought to promote liberal ideals.   
Will the EU and the US clash over their interests and/or approaches in the EU’s neighbourhood? 
In Central and Eastern Europe and the Western Balkans, the US and EU worked in alliance and 
shared objectives and methods. Their common diagnosis of the problems of the region and 
agreement on the solutions to these problems contributed to making Central and Eastern Europe a 
success story of fast and deep convergence on Western norms of democracy and a market 
economy. 
Standard European commentaries have until recently suggested that this transatlantic harmony 
could hardly be extended to the Middle East. Following the period of profound disagreements 
over the Iraqi war, with most Europeans apparently convinced that the war would be politically 
counterproductive, for example in boosting radical Islamic tendencies, there now emerges a more 
mixed picture. While the growth of radical Islam seems undeniable, at the same time the cause of 
Arab democracy also seems to advance. The Iraqi elections in early 2005 passed far less badly 
than many had feared. Minor but still interesting openings towards electoral democracy emerged 
in February 2005 with the decision in Egypt to allow some (restricted) competition for the next 
presidential election and with the municipal elections actually held in Saudi Arabia. And then 
came the dramatic ‘cedar revolution’ in Lebanon in response to the assassination of the former 
prime minister, which seemed to be taking inspiration from the ‘orange revolution’ in Ukraine, 
and with the US and France working in conspicuous alliance to pressure Syria to withdraw its 
troops from Lebanon. The Lebanese-Ukrainian-Georgian comparisons become all the more 
evocative for the EU, since the neighbourhood policy was initially much criticised for grouping 
European and Arab neighbours together, the objection being that while the former are all Council 
of Europe members, the Arab states seemed deeply resistant to democratic change.     
If the Iraqi elections and the drum-beat of President Bush’s democracy discourse are in effect 
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Action Plans of the ENP, which are explicitly looking for openings in the political economy 
structures of the partner states to unblock the obstacles to reform policies. The combination of 
Ukraine’s orange revolution and the new developments in the Middle East have created openings 
that the EU policy-makers could hardly have been imagined when the neighbourhood policy 
began to be formulated. It now also provides an opportunity for renewal of the transatlantic 
partnership based on the logic of complementary capabilities.   
On a regional level, the key to unblocking political and economic reform in the Mashreq region is 
the handling of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the prospect for peace in the Middle East. 
Success in achieving a peace settlement could provide the impetus for a concerted regional move 
towards democratisation and better governance. For that to happen, the EU and the US will have 
to work together and use their combined leverage on Palestine and Israel to encourage the two 
parties to agree on a solution. With a peaceful settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the 
priorities in the region could shift and political actors may become more willing to put on their 
agendas some of the reforms that the EU has targeted as areas for conditional support.  
5.  Summary of some assessments and major outstanding questions for EU 
policy 
Our assessment of the Barcelona process so far is that it has been a valuable systemic/institutional 
advance in Euro-Med relations and a valuable confidence-building measure on a large scale. But 
it has not been a sufficient driving force to have created a momentum of economic, political and 
social advance in the partner states. Nor is it evident what might have been the potential domestic 
drivers of change with which the incentives of the Barcelona process might have connected with 
greater effect in recent years.  
It is thus quite plausible that the EU should seek some new advance – through the ENP – to build 
on the positive features of the Barcelona process and so try to introduce some new driving force. 
The Action Plans currently being adopted point to a way ahead. In essence these are proposing to 
replace many of the vague intentions in the Association Agreements of the Barcelona process 
with another very extensive set of policy prescriptions. The particularity of the Action Plans is 
that they seek to make these prescriptions more operational by linking them to the domestic 
policy programmes of the partner state or EU policy norms and standards as an external anchor.  
The major outstanding questions concern the mechanisms for setting these comprehensive Action 
Plans into real motion, rather than relapsing into token diplomacy. In this preliminary paper the 
aim has been to sketch some alternative approaches.  
We first crystallised alternative approaches for the ENP to become a driving force under the 
headings of ‘conditionality’ and ‘socialisation’. The conditionality concept would mean that the 
EU sets out i) what incentives it offers, and ii) the conditions on which these incentives would be 
delivered. The socialisation concept relies essentially on a learning process that comes from the 
extensive interaction between actors in the partner states and the EU, which induces the partner 
states to engage in policy reforms that are to a degree modelled on EU norms or derive some 
inspiration from them.  
We sketched three categories of conditionality: a) ‘normal’ sectoral policy conditions, b) negative 
conditionality from sanctions to war, and c) positive conditionality and incentives in ‘overdrive’. 
With this last term ‘overdrive’ we identify the possibility that various sectoral incentives and 
conditionalities could in some circumstances connect with synergy in an overarching political 
idea or movement, and so succeed in creating a powerful dynamic of transformation. We have 
given some concrete examples of how or where this is conceivable. These include the case where 
a competitive dynamic could be triggered between the partner states. 22 | EMERSON & NOUTCHEVA 
 
We discussed the familiar issue of sequencing or relative prioritisation of economic versus 
political reform efforts or the case for working simultaneously on both. While it looks plausible 
that pro-democracy efforts should receive a stronger emphasis under the ENP compared with the 
Barcelona process so far, the case for the EU to work hard to initiate an important dynamic in 
market reform areas, linked to its own internal market policies, seems at this stage to look like a 
particularly strong one.  
Finally, the issue of EU-US policy coherence in the region remains of exceptional importance. 
For the EU to become a driving force for reform in the region at least requires that it does not 
have to face an uphill struggle against negative tendencies, for example in the widening and 
deepening of radical Islam. Until recently it seemed that this was indeed an uphill struggle. 
However, this picture maybe starting to change, with the very recent political developments in 
the region and most dramatically those in Lebanon, a partner state of the neighbourhood policy. 
Here the very different and positive model – that of complementary EU-US capabilities – begins 
to suggest itself as a real possibility. 
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